From Primed Concepts to Action:
A Meta-Analysis of the Behavioral Effects of Incidentally-Presented Words

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Abstract

A meta-analysis assessed the behavioral impact of and psychological processes associated with presenting words connected to an action or a goal representation. The average and distribution of 352 effect sizes (analyzed using fixed-effects and random-effects models) was obtained from 133 studies (84 reports) in which word primes were incidentally presented to participants, with a non-opposite control group, prior to measuring a behavioral dependent variable. Findings revealed a small behavioral priming effect ($d_{FE} = 0.332$, $d_{RE} = 0.352$), which was robust across methodological procedures and only minimally biased by the publication of positive (vs. negative) results. Theory testing analyses indicated that more valued behavior or goal concepts (e.g., associated with important outcomes or values) were associated with stronger priming effects than were less valued behaviors. Furthermore, there was some evidence of persistence of goal effects over time. These results support the notion that goal activation contributes over and above perception-behavior in explaining priming effects. In sum, theorizing about the role of value and satisfaction in goal activation pointed to stronger effects of a behavior or goal concept on overt action. There was no evidence that expectancy (ease of achieving the goal) moderated priming effects.

Keywords: priming, automaticity, goal, motivation, meta-analysis
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The worst is yet to come for priming … over the next two or three years you're going to see an avalanche of failed replications published. (Bartlett, 2013, referencing David Shanks)

In 1996, Bargh, Chen, and Burrows asked 34 undergraduates of New York University to complete a brief research task and then request a second task from the researcher in a nearby room. The first task comprised scrambled sentences presented to participants as one of the following three lists of words: they her respect see usually, they her bother see usually, or they her exercising see usually. After unscrambling the sentences, participants went to look for the experimenter who was busy chatting with a friend.

It was not surprising that the NYU students were able to correctly form 30 sentences like they usually respect her, they usually bother her, or they usually see her. The surprise was that the content of some of the unscrambled sentences (containing politeness, rudeness, or neutral themes varying among participants) influenced the time students took to interrupt and request the experimenter to proceed with the second study. College students who had unscrambled sentences about rudeness were more likely to interrupt the conversation than were those who had unscrambled sentences about politeness or neutral topics (Bargh et al., 1996). In light of this
evidence, Bargh and colleagues (1996) argued that priming, the activation of various mental constructs unbeknownst to individuals via perception of external stimuli (Bargh et al., 2010; Bargh & Chartrand, 2000), was not limited in its effects to social perception (Bargh, 1994; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977) but instead reached the more substantial domain of action. Since that time and for nearly two decades, social psychologists and scholars in many other fields have attempted to understand the perceptual and motivational principles responsible for the intriguing observations in Bargh et al.’s (1996) seminal study. For example, Bargh and his colleagues (2001) tasked students with solving a series of word search puzzles that either contained synonyms of achievement (e.g., win, achieve) or control words (e.g., building, staple). Students who initially found achievement words found more words on subsequent word search puzzles than did those who initially found neutral words. Students had been reminded of achievement goals, leading to improved intellectual performance.

Despite the excitement surrounding effects of primes on performance, the Zeitgeist changed as a result of failures to directly replicate the phenomenon (Doyen et al., 2012; Harris et al., 2013; Klein et al., 2014; Shanks et al., 2013). Recent years have seen a dramatic shift towards the more somber intellectual climate apparent in the quotes below, the former of which is taken from a leaked e-mail.

As all of you know, of course, questions have been raised about the robustness of priming results. The storm of doubts is fed by several sources, including the recent exposure of fraudulent researchers, general concerns with replicability that affect many disciplines, multiple reported failures to replicate salient results in the priming literature, and the growing belief in the existence of a pervasive file drawer problem that undermines two
methodological pillars of your field: the preference for conceptual over literal replication and the use of meta-analysis. [...] For all these reasons, right or wrong, your field is now the poster child for doubts about the integrity of psychological research. (Kahneman, 2012)

Now, goal-priming experiments are coming under scrutiny — and in the process, revealing a problem at the heart of psychological research itself. (Satel, 2013, pg. SR8)

Naturally, the researchers spearheading priming research raised concerns about both the nature and tone of these public statements. Some of the responses made reference to prior successful replications of an effect (Cesario, Plaks, & Higgins, 2006; Hull, Slone, Metayer, & Matthews, 2002) in the face of other failures to replicate (Doyen et al., 2012), and called for meta-analytic approaches rather than singular replications (Bargh, 2012). Other responses questioned the practices leading to the publication of some replications with minimal or no peer review (e.g., Schnall, 2014a), and yet others pointed to inaccuracies in the methodology and inferences present in the replication failures (e.g., Schnall, 2014b; Schwarz & Strack, 2014). Representative quotes include:

In science the way to answer questions about replicability of effects is through statistical techniques such as meta-analysis, as well as qualitative reviews of the literature. (Bargh, 2012)
For the replication special issue all replication authors were deprived of this mechanism of quality control: There was no peer-review of the manuscript, not by authors of the original work, nor by anybody else [...] To make any meaningful scientific contribution the quality standards for replications need to be at least as high as for the original findings. (Schnall, 2014a)

In the interest of a “direct” replication, the authors chose to go with the historical German values, resulting in a replication that can be described as “technically direct” while missing the goal of realizing psychological conditions that are comparable to the original study. [...] In general, meaningful replications need to realize the psychological conditions of the original study. (Schwarz & Strack, 2014, pg. 305-306)

Can a well-executed meta-analysis of the behavioral effects of incidentally presented concepts transform this controversy and inform the many disciplines concerned with this phenomenon? We think so, particularly through the use of sophisticated methods to detect and mitigate systematic elimination of null and negative findings (a form of publication bias often referred to as the file drawer problem; see Cooper, 2010; Cooper & Hedges, 1994). With the objective of gathering the most comprehensive evidence to date, we obtained published and unpublished research on the performance effects of priming concepts compared with a control condition. We calculated Cohen’s $g$ by subtracting the mean of the control group from the mean of the priming group and dividing that by the pooled $SD$, or used analogous methods for categorical dependent measures.

Our meta-analysis synthesized 352 published and unpublished effect sizes, obtained from
research conducted in the US and internationally. Priming methods included various forms of supraliminal and subliminal presentation of words clearly linked to a behavior or goal (desired end-state) concept (e.g., go, affiliate). The most commonly primed concepts were presented supraliminally (e.g., via scrambled sentences and word puzzles) and pertained to achievement, although such social behaviors as helping were also highly prevalent. Among many others, performance measures included a score for test performance (number of solved problems), time spent on a task, and observer ratings of overt behavior (e.g., rated anxious behavior in Geers et al., 2005). Non-performance measures such as concept accessibility, as measures of intentions, attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge, were deemed ineligible in an attempt to model effects on actual cognitive and motor performance.

Another important objective of the present meta-analysis was to test the theoretical principles of goal-related priming. We sought to examine how value-related manipulations and satisfaction opportunities following priming affected effect sizes. Specifically, as scholars have theorized that goal pursuit increases with value (i.e., an evaluation based on the outcomes or abstract entities associated with a behavior or end-state; Forster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007), we tested moderation by conditions coded as high vs. low value. Moreover, as the strength of goals presumably remains or increases over time until fulfillment (Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Bargh et al., 2001; Forster et al., 2005, 2007; Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Zeigarnik, 1927), we examined moderation by relevant vs. irrelevant filler tasks that respectively can and cannot satisfy the goal. Whereas non-goal concept priming should decay, goal mediated effects should be sustained or even increase as time goes by when the task following priming is irrelevant and thus unlikely to satisfy the evoked goal (DeCoster & Claypool, 2004; Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985; Srull & Wyer, 1980). Importantly, although past primary research considered
value and satisfaction separately, we were able to estimate these effects in combination as a way of precisely delineating the boundary conditions for strong behavioral priming effects.

Our meta-analysis is distinct from several other meta-analyses of priming in the field of psychology (Cameron, Brown-Iannuzzi, & Payne, 2012; DeCoste & Clapyool, 2004; Van den Bussche, Van den Noortgate, & Reynvoet, 2009). Cameron, Brown-Iannuzzi, and Payne (2012) concentrated on precise but contrived computerized sequential priming tasks (e.g., AMP, Evaluative Priming, Lexical Decision Tasks, Eriksen flanker, and shooter tasks) and averaged behavior and intention effects. Also, distinct from our synthesis, DeCoste and Claypool (2004) studied the influence of stereotype and trait primes as evaluative primes without behavioral endpoints. Finally, Van den Bussche, Van den Noortgate, and Reynvoet (2009) focused only on the effects of masked semantic priming (i.e., subliminal, visual semantic primes from semantic categorization, lexical decision tasks, or naming tasks) on response times during categorization or naming tasks of interest as measures of semantic interpretation rather than behavior per se. Therefore, our meta-analysis is not only timely but also novel.

**The Origins of Priming Research in Social Psychology**

The conception of priming, that environmental stimuli may affect subsequent responses by activating mental constructs without conscious realization, concerned cognitive psychological questions about semantic knowledge before its application to social psychology (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). The initial presentation of a set of words, researchers proposed and found, facilitated responses to semantically-related words (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Fazio, 2001; Forbach, Stanners, & Hochhaus, 1974; Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; Neely, 1977) and increased the likelihood of generating those words later in a study (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Segal & Cofer, 1960; Storms, 1958). Cognitive psychology studies on carryover effects similar
to Segal and Cofer (1960) and Storms (1958) further influenced multiple research streams about the influence of experimentally-presented stimuli on social judgments (Bargh et al., 2010; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, 2000; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980) and related attitudes towards a stimulus (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Fazio et al., 1986; Fazio, 2001; Krosnick, Judd, & Wittinbrink, 2005), supposedly outside of awareness, intentionality, and/or control (Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; Bargh et al., 1996; Logan, 1989).

Early research on the social effects of semantic priming investigated whether priming a trait category could influence subsequent impressions of a person (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; DeCoster & Claypool, 2004; Fazio, 2001; Higgins et al., 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980). In the classic demonstration inspired from Huttenlocher and Higgins (1971, 1972), Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977) asked participants to complete two ostensibly-unrelated studies, the first of which involved memorizing a handful of words denoting positive or negative traits while identifying colors on a screen. After this task, participants read about and formed an impression of a hypothetical man named Donald, who was described as actively seeking excitement. Demonstrating how incidental word presentation could affect later judgments, exposure to positive words yielded more positive evaluations of Donald than exposure to negative words (Higgins et al., 1977). Several other scholars would later extend these findings to show automatic influences on social judgments after increasing the accessibility (e.g., the celerity with which a concept can be retrieved from memory; Higgins et al., 1977) of a number of concepts linked to the mental representations of a category (Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988; Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Higgins, 1989; Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985; Kunda, 1990; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980). These early theories of the operation of priming on social perception established the principles of incidental influences on social judgments (Higgins et al., 1977; Srull

More critical to our analysis, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the burgeoning application of priming to social judgments culminated in extending the ideomotor principle into the postulation of priming effects based on the perception-behavior link. Bargh and his colleagues (Bargh 1990; Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; Bargh et al., 1996) argued that stimuli available in the environment could be relevant to and therefore activate chronic behavior concepts and ultimately behavioral outcomes linked to those concepts. Associations between an environmental stimulus and these mental representations supposedly strengthen over time and increase the effects of merely perceiving these stimuli on subsequent actions (Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; Bargh et al., 1996; Bargh & Morsella, 2009; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; for related issues, see also Higgins et al., 1977; Fazio et al., 1986; Wegner, 1994).

Evidence supporting the perception-behavior link followed the ideomotor model defined by James (1890; also see Carpenter, 1852), albeit without the conscious (ideo) component from James (1890). First, early research accumulated to show how exposure to aggressive behaviors could trigger overt aggression (e.g., the media; Berkowitz, 1984; Carver, Ganellen, Priming, & Chambers, 1983) and how activating the schema of helping could promote altruism (Fong, 1984). More recent studies also revealed that mimicry, walking speed, and problem solving could follow changes in category accessibility (Bargh et al., 1996; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Higgins & Chaires, 1980; Shah & Kruglanski, 2003). In addition, scholars identified important preconditions for the effects, such as the existence of a prior association between the behavior or goal concept and the behavior (Bargh, 2002; Bargh, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2010; for the general principle, see Lewin, 1951). Priming the concept of elderly only decreases memory for
participants with frequent exposure to elderly individuals (Dijksterhuis, Aarts, Bargh, & van Knippenberg, 2000), and priming specific drinks or brands of drinks only influences drinking among thirsty consumers (Strahan et al., 2002; Veltkamp, Custers, & Aarts, 2011). Recent theorizing has also suggested that only primes that can be confused with the actor’s thoughts have the potential to exert congruent effects on behavioral responses (Loersch, 2009; Loersch & Payne, 2011), and that invoked goals are an important explanatory device for the behavioral effects of priming (Bargh et al., 2001; Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994).

**Goal Mediated Effects of Primes on Behavior**

In addition to the perception-behavior link, research on priming has emphasized that longstanding goals and motivations can be activated by stimuli in the environment without conscious awareness, intentionality, or control (Bargh et al., 2001; Bargh & Morsella, 2009; Bargh et al., 2012; Chartrand et al., 2008; Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010; Hassin, 2013). Stimuli associated with valued actions that have become routinized may elicit behavior following general motivational principles that researchers consider evidence of goal mediation (Aarts, Custers, & Veltkamp, 2008; Marien et al., 2012; Papies & Aarts, 2013; see also Masicampo & Baumeister, 2011). ¹

By definition, stimuli linked to valued actions or states have been expected to elicit greater goal activation than stimuli linked to actions or states of lesser value (Forster et al., 2005, 2007). Stronger effects have been shown in studies that introduce incentives (e.g., Forster et al., 2005; Marien et al., 2012), distinguish levels of the chronic value of a particular action (e.g., Fitzsimons, Chartrand, & Fitzsimons, 2008; Marien et al., 2012; Papies & Hamstra, 2010), associate primes with positive affect (e.g., Aarts et al., 2007; Hart & Gable, 2013), and induce high commitment to an action (e.g., Maltarich, 2009). For example, Levesque and Pelletier
(2003) found that individuals who were high in autonomous motivation performed more tasks involving intrinsic motivation (e.g., working on puzzles during a “free-choice period”) than individuals who were low in this trait. Clearly, valuing a concept can lead to more associations because people think more about that concept, but there is also the expectation that a valued concept is linked to goal representations that are ideally positioned to initiate action.

The expectancy or perceived probability of achieving a goal is another important consideration, although the direction of its association with goal pursuit has been controversial. Some scholars have proposed that increasing the expectancy or perceived probability of achieving a goal bolsters goal strength (Forster et al., 2005, 2007), whereas others have argued that difficult goals strengthen goal pursuit effects (Heath, Larrick, & Wu, 1999; Locke & Latham, 1990; Stajkovich et al., 2006). According to Forster et al. (2005, 2007), expectancy should interact with goal value to intensify pursuit such that high-value concepts may only motivate action when people perceive a high probability of success (Forster et al., 2007). According to Locke and Latham (1990), however, higher task difficulty can intensify effort and therefore improve performance, which predicts a direct effect of expectancy on behavior priming (Locke & Latham, 2002). The discrepancy between these theories is curious: one suggests that attainable end-states hinder motivation and the other that attainable end-states enhance it. Although opposite predictions without much clarity on their boundary conditions can ultimately lead to a null effect, we still set to examine the effect of expectancy alone and in interaction with value.

As the behavior resulting from primed goals is supposed to involve persistence over obstacles (Bargh et al., 2001; Bargh et al., 2010; Custers et al., 2008; Gollwitzer & Wicklund, 1985), a goal account includes the prediction that relative to perception-behavior effects, goal-
mediated priming shows relatively less decay or even strengthens over time (e.g., Bargh et al., 2001; Crusius & Mussweiler, 2012; Custers et al., 2008). Thus, a major difference between goal-mediated priming and direct perception-behavior effects concerns the role of a temporal delay between the priming task and the dependent measure of behavior (Chartrand et al., 2008; Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Forster et al., 2007). The length of temporal delays used in past research has varied, including three (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996), five (e.g., Albarracin & Hart, 2011), and eight (Fitzsimons et al., 2008) minutes between the prime and the behavior measure. Whereas social perception priming effects should decay with a temporal delay (DeCoster & Claypool, 2004; Higgins et al., 1985; Higgins, 1989), primed goals can increase or persist until satiation (Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Bargh et al., 2001; Bargh et al., 2010; Chartrand et al., 2008; Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 1998). For example, in a series of consumer studies, Chartrand et al. (2008) used a manipulation of either three or eight minutes between thrift vs. prestige priming and a choice task, uncovering stronger effects after more time (eight minutes) had passed (e.g., Fitzsimons, Chartrand, & Fitzsimons, 2008; Chartrand et al., 2008; for use of this notion to rule out goal mediation, see Chartrand & Bargh, 1996). Furthermore, the effect of delay is contingent on having goal satisfaction opportunities during the time interval. For example, irrelevant filler tasks introduced during the post-priming delay (e.g., writing street names after impression-formation goals; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996) should preclude goal fulfillment, whereas relevant filler tasks (e.g., action versus inaction task after priming an action or inaction goal; Albarracin et al., 2008) should cause goal fulfillment and weaken priming effects. Relevant tasks that provide satiation opportunities may lead to inhibition (i.e., based on that the activity should reduce the action tendency galvanized by the prime; Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Bargh et al., 2010), showing either elimination of the effect or a rebound, Zeigarnik-type effect (Heckhausen, 1991; Liberman
& Forster, 2000; Ovsiankina, 1928; Zeigarnik, 1927). Importantly, however, these effects of satisfaction opportunity should be more apparent when behaviors are highly valued or have the needed level of expectancy to initiate a motivational process.

Of course, direct perception-behavior effects may co-occur with goal activation, or one process may exist to the exclusion of the other. First, if behavioral priming is due to mere perception-behavior effects, the effects of the primes should not be contingent on value, expectancy, or delay/satisfaction opportunities. Second, if behavioral priming requires goal-mediated processes, no priming effects should emerge when conditions are not conducive to goal activation. For example, conditions associated with lower value or expectancy with respect to a behavior or state may show no behavioral priming, particularly when there is insufficient time for motivational tension to escalate (Chartrand et al., 2008). Third, if both processes occur, then behavioral priming effects should be stronger in conditions leading to goal mediation but would still be apparent in conditions associated with lower value or expectancy with respect to a behavior or state, as well as in the absence of intervening time between the prime and the behavioral measure. For example, decay in priming effects in the absence of a delay would be indicative of perception-behavior effects rather than goal mediation, suggesting that perception-behavior exists in the absence of goal mediation.

**The Present Meta-Analysis**

The current meta-analysis synthesized research on behavioral priming effects resulting from the incidental presentation of words to estimate an overall effect and determine the plausibility of a goal-mediation theoretical account. We restricted word primes to those that directly related to a concept (e.g., rudeness-related words and rudeness; Bargh et al., 1996, Study 1) instead of those with metaphorical meaning (e.g., elderly stereotype, money; Bargh et al.,
1996, studies 2a-2b; Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006). We calculated and pooled standardized mean differences, Hedges’ $d$s (Hedges & Olkin, 1985) to compare the effects of words related to a concept with a non-opposite control set of words. Our survey of the literature and authors within that literature generated 352 calculable $d$s stemming from 133 studies and 84 papers. Our test of theory involved analyzing the effects of value, expectancy, and delay with satisfaction opportunity following priming, as well as interactions between value and expectancy, and of value or expectancy with satisfaction opportunity following priming.

We also aimed to explore the variation in methodologies employed by various studies within the priming literature. Priming experiments have varied in prime liminality, dosage, and prime abstractness or generality (Bargh et al., 2010; Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Kruglanski et al., 2002; Vallecher & Wegner, 1987, 1989; Albarracin et al., 2008; Bargh et al., 2001; Uysal, 2010). Research has also been quite diverse with respect to the use of awareness checks (e.g., funneled debriefing or other awareness checks; Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) and types of behavioral measures. Common supraliminal priming methods comprise word searches (e.g., Bargh et al., 2001), scrambled sentence tasks (Bargh et al., 1996; Srull & Wyer, 1979), and word completions (Hart & Gable, 2013), whereas common subliminal methods include lexical decisions tasks (e.g., Strahan et al., 2002), parafoveal priming (i.e., primes appear in the parafoveal visual field at 45, 135, 225, and 315 degree angles; e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1996), and foveal priming (i.e., primes appear in the foveal visual field; presented in the center of screen; e.g., Aarts et al., 2007). Further, experiments also vary in the proportion of primes versus neutral-word or nonword controls, which may have a bearing on the ultimate strength of the priming (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980). Some priming paradigms mixed primes with distractor words (e.g., 15 out of 30 words in Bargh et al., 1996; seven out of
13 words in Bargh et al., 2001), whereas others presented only prime words (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; McCulloch et al., 2008). Finally, studies have widely differed on their selection of behavioral measures, including performance measures (e.g., anagrams, word searches; Bargh et al., 2001; Crusius & Mussweiler, 2012), categorical choices of behavior or products (e.g., Albarracin, Wang, & Leeper, 2009; Sela & Shiv, 2009; Strahan et al., 2002), rates of helping or donation behavior (e.g., Macrae & Johnston, 1998; Smeesters, Wheeler, & Kay, 2009), and motor behaviors (e.g., time spent, number of pegs dropped during a manual dexterity task, the 9-hole peg test; Mathiowetz et al., 1985; Ginsberg, Rohmer, & Louvet, 2012; Wryobeck & Chen, 2003), among others. These factors were considered in an exploratory fashion, as a way of providing information on the future design of behavior priming studies.

Methods

Literature Search

We searched PsycINFO, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, the Reproducibility Project Open Science Framework, PsychFileDrawer.Org, Communication Abstracts, Advances in Consumer Research (Proceedings of the Association for Consumer Research), the Foreign Doctoral Dissertations Database of the Center for Research Libraries (http://www.crl.edu), PubMed, the Education Resources Information Center (ERIC), and ZPID on the Databases of the Institute of Psychology Information for the German-Speaking Countries (http://www.zpid.de). We searched for empirical studies cited in PsycINFO using the following search string: (prime OR priming OR primed OR automatic OR automatically OR nonconscious* OR incidental*) AND (behavior OR goal OR action OR motivation) NOT ("semantic prim*") NOT ("affect* prim*") AND me.exact("Empirical Study") AND pop.exact("Human"). We used a version of this search string without the last two restrictions while searching ProQuest Dissertations and the
Theses database, and a version without the last four restrictions while searching ZPID, ERIC, Foreign Doctoral Dissertations, and PubMed. In addition, we requested 320 published authors for additional data and the listhosts of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, the Society for Consumer Psychology, and the Society for Experimental Social Psychology.

Anonymous data submission was allowed as a way of decreasing barriers to obtaining these data. Our search was conducted up through June 2014, and contained all results from as early back in time as the databases had records (i.e., 1855 for PsycINFO and PubMed; 1897 for Proquest Dissertations and Theses). In the beginning of our screening, we examined all titles and abstracts for relevant studies. In a second phase, all articles that passed the first phase of screening were examined for our inclusion criteria, specified below.

**Inclusion Criteria**

Reports were not selected based on language. Rather, reports written in languages other than English were translated by coders with good knowledge of the language. Research reports were included when at least one condition in a study met the following eligibility criteria:

1. **Experimental**: Studies must have an experimental manipulation of priming in which participants are randomly assigned into conditions.

2. **Presence of word prime**: Studies must have a prime manipulation (whether within- or between-subjects) that is a word directly associated with an action. For example, the impression-formation words (e.g., opinion, personality, evaluation, impression) from Chartrand and Bargh (1996) and the achievement words (e.g., win, compete, succeed, strive, attain, achieve, master) from Bargh et al. (2001) were included. In contrast, we excluded any studies in which a social inference (e.g., goal contagion; Aarts et al., 2004), a biography of another individual (e.g., *Mother Theresa* in Gollwitzer et al., 2011), a social target or group (e.g., one’s
mother, nurses; Custers et al., 2008; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003), a picture (e.g., a brand logo or picture of a woman winning a race; Fitzsimons, Chartrand, & Fitzsimons, 2008; Latham & Piccolo, 2012), physical movements (e.g., Natanzon & Ferguson, 2012), or sounds (e.g., Friedman, 2007) were used with the objective of priming a goal. These strict criteria allowed us to isolate the cases in which the primed words have a clear behavioral implication (i.e., achievement words promoting more achievement) without additional inferences about the associations participants have about the primed content. For example, if instead of priming creativity researchers primed the Apple logo (e.g., Fitzsimons et al., 2008), the research report was not deemed eligible due to the more complex inferential chain assumed in this priming. Priming money with words relevant to money (e.g., Vohs et al., 2006) prior to measuring social behavior was not judged eligible because these words do not directly relate to prosocial action without more complex assumptions about intervening psychological processes (i.e., money leads to self-sufficiency which in turn leads to less social behavior). Similarly, the future-related words influencing consumer decisions in Mogilner et al. (2012) were not eligible because the psychological link is more complex than either perception-behavior or goal-mediated processes. In this particular case, future words supposedly induce the desire to be happy, which in turn influences consumption behavior, but future words have minimal correspondence with product decisions without these additional assumptions.

3. Priming rather than direct goal induction: Reports must include a goal primed incidentally, without calling attention to the connection between the priming task and the outcome task or trying to induce intentional behavior. For example, some research included incidentally primed goals with orthogonally manipulated explicitly assigned goals in the form of
an instructional set (e.g., Stajkovich et al., 2006). Studies that only used direct instructional sets were excluded (e.g., Brunye & Taylor, 2009).

4. *Presence of adequate control condition:* Eligible experiments compared a relevant goal-prime with a neutral or non-opposite goal control (e.g., impression versus memory in Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; achievement versus control in Crusius & Mussweiler, 2012). We excluded studies and contrasts that primed opposite goals (e.g., thrift vs. prestige in Chartrand et al., 2008) to ensure that we could isolate the effect of the prime relative to the non-opposite baseline.

5. *Presence of a behavior measure:* Studies were required to measure a behavioral outcome in the form of (a) performance on a scoreable task (e.g., anagrams completed, Wisconsin Card Sort Task performance, GRE score; see Bargh et al., 2001; Hart & Gable, 2013; Hassin, Bargh, & Zimerman, 2009), (b) a motor behavior (e.g., holding a weight in Sambolec, Kerr, & Messe, 2007; guiding a ring along a wire, Legal, Meyer, & Delouvee, 2007), (c) a choice participants expected to enact (e.g., selecting a watch type that could be won in a lottery, Chartrand et al., 2008), (d) actual helping or donation behavior (e.g., actual dictator game giving in Harrell, 2012), (e) time spent working on a task as a reflection of either speed or persistence (e.g., Shah & Kruglanski, 2003), or (f) actual consumption (e.g., of food or drink in Strahan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2002). We excluded studies that only used hypothetical monetary decisions (e.g., behavior in a hypothetical trust game in DeMarree et al., 2012) or hypothetical scenarios (e.g., what the participant would do in a business scenario in Quinn & Schlenker, 2002), attitude or confidence scales (e.g., confidence in Erb, Bioy, & Hilton, 2002), neurophysiological or physiological measures (e.g., heart rate, ERP; see Williams, Bargh, Nocera, & Gray, 2009; Hepler & Albarracin, 2013), self-predictions or intentions (e.g., of choices in Kawada,
Oettingen, Gollwitzer, & Bargh, 2004), and evaluations of other people (e.g., attractiveness in Huang & Bargh, 2008). If studies contained multiple behaviors (e.g., persistence and performance in Shah & Kruglanski, 2003) or codings of the same task (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996), we calculated effect sizes for each of those measures and incorporated them into a repeated-measures analysis.

6. **Statistics:** Studies needed to have sufficient information (means, standard deviations, F-ratios, t-tests, etc.) to calculate effect sizes. We contacted authors to complete reports and used this information when provided, which led to an additional 26 effect sizes. This criterion led to excluding 11 studies for which we could not calculate an effect size (Jia, 2012, Study 3; McCulloch, 2004, Study 2; Perugini, Conner, & O’Gorman, 2011, Studies 2-3; Shah & Kruglanski, 2002, Studies 1-4; Strahan et al., 2002, Study 1 and follow-up 1; Todd, 2010, Study 1).

**Meta-Analytic Strategy**

We coded effect sizes in terms of Cohen’s $g$ and later transformed them to Hedges $d$ by correcting $g$ for sample size bias (Hedges, 1981; Hedges & Olkin, 1985). Effect sizes were calculated from a variety of reported statistics including means, mean confidence intervals, log-odds and log-odds ratios, standard deviations, $t$-tests, and $F$-ratios (DeCoster, 2009; Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Johnson & Eagly, 2000). We coded effect sizes at all theoretically-relevant levels of experimentally and quasi-manipulated (e.g., split on a personality variable in Levesque, 1999) conditions and collapsed non-manipulated factors that were not theoretically important (e.g., gender in Bargh et al. 2001, Study 1), by combining means and standard deviations or by applying a correction factor to supplied test statistics (Johnson & Eagly, 2000, 2014; Morris & DeShon, 1997). Effect sizes were coded as positive if the behavior was in line with the primed
concept, such as better academic performance when achievement was primed. In contrast, effect sizes were coded as negative if the observed behavior was in contrast with the primed concept, such as in the case of low-achievement motivation individuals who responded to primed achievement goals by pursuing opposite behavior (Hart & Albarracin, 2009). We weighted effect sizes by the inverse of the associated fixed-effects variances (Borenstein et al., 2009; DeCoster, 2009; Johnson & Eagly, 2000; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) and the random-effects variance $\tau^2$ using the Metafor package (Borenstein et al., 2010; Viechtbauer, 2010).

We used the homogeneity statistic ($Q$), which has a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the total number of effect sizes minus one ($e – 1$), to test for the presence of significant variability in the effect sizes (Borenstein et al., 2009; Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Hunter & Schmidt, 2004; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). We also employed the $I^2$ statistic as a second measure of heterogeneity that is more useful to compare across meta-analyses and less dependent on the number of synthesized effects (Borenstein et al., 2009; Higgins & Thompson, 2002; Huedo-Medina et al., 2006).

Some studies contributed more than one effect size because multiple experimental contrast units ($k$) were compared with a single control prime and/or because of the use of multiple dependent behavioral measures. Given this violation of statistical independence, we employed methods to account for potentially correlated error terms among observations (Gleser & Olkin, 1994). We modeled the results hierarchically with effect sizes as level one observations and studies as level two observations (Littel, Milliken, Stroup, Wolfinger, & Schabenberger, 2006; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). All dependent measures were analyzed simultaneously with each measure having its own unique weighting based on aforementioned variances. We also
conducted analyses selecting a single effect, which led to the same conclusions but are not presented due to space constraints.

We addressed publication bias in four ways. First, we computed the fail-safe number on individual effect sizes ($N_{FS}$), which corresponds to the number of unpublished negative findings (i.e., disconfirming findings that are either opposite to predictions or null) required to reduce a statistically significant result to nonsignificance (DeCoster, 2009; Rosenthal, 1979; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008) using Rosenberg’s (2005) calculator. If the fail-safe number exceeds a cutoff value ($5k+10$) specified elsewhere in the literature, publication bias is not deemed to be the driver of the synthesized effect (DeCoster, 2009; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008). Second, we employed funnel plots, which depict effect sizes against precision (plotted here as the effect-size standard errors), and the trim-and-fill procedure to de-bias effects (Duval & Tweedie, 2000; Light & Pillemar, 1984; Sutton, 2009). In funnel plots, if no publication bias is present, the distribution of effect sizes should be symmetric and should, as sample size increases, tighten to form a funnel shape. If there is publication bias, an asymmetry should emerge in the lower-left-hand corner of the funnel where small studies with nonsignificant effects would not have been published (Egger et al., 1997; Sutton, 2009). Trim-and-fill excises points in the asymmetry of the funnel plot, recalculates the new effect size estimate, and fills in the original asymmetric studies and their mirror images to ensure accurate confidence intervals for the new effect size estimate (Borenstein et al., 2009; Duval & Tweedie, 2000). We used trim-and-fill procedures on individual effect sizes to guide our decision of outliers to cut. Third, we examined the Hedges’ $d$ values of individual effect sizes in a normal-quantile plot, which graphs observed effect sizes against expected effect sizes based on draws from a normal distribution. This graph includes a diagonal of $X = Y$ near which the effect sizes should rest if the effect sizes are from a normal
distribution. If the effect sizes deviate from a normal distribution or are sparsely present near zero, there is evidence of publication bias (Borman & Grigg, 2009; Wang & Bushman, 1999).

Fourth, we employed a $p$-curve analysis to determine whether or not selective reporting can entirely explain a literature. The $p$-curve examines the spread of $p$-values of researchers’ focal hypotheses to test whether $p$-values are clustered around $p = .05$ (suggestive of $p$-hacking), vs. $p = .01$ or $p = .02$ (evidence that selective reporting cannot explain the effects). The $p$-curve also considers whether the studies are underpowered to test the effect of interest (possible selective reporting effects; Simonsohn et al., 2014).

When testing moderators, we fit both fixed- and random-effects models using both single-variable meta-regressions testing the effect of a lone moderator and multiple meta-regressions inclusive of all descriptive and methodological controls, still modeling the effects hierarchically at the level of the study. No substitution of missing data points was done; missing effect sizes were not estimated, and no moderator values were missing. We standardized all variables prior to analysis (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).

**Moderator Coding**

Moderators of the effect sizes were coded independently by four of the authors, all of whom were intensely involved in research in psychology, had taken graduate courses in the area, and were familiar with the literature, after an initial calibration session. Coding also had a validation stage in which two of the authors reviewed the work of other coders and resolved disagreements. Agreement for all variables was sufficient ($\kappa > .7$, $\alpha > .8$) unless noted below.

**Theoretical Moderators.**

We coded for value, expectancy, and delay with satisfaction opportunity as a way of testing critical predictions about the possibility of goal mediation under certain conditions.
**Value.** We first recorded if a study distinguished higher, lower, or neither higher nor lower value conditions using a manipulation or separated conditions based on a subject variable signaling differences in concept importance, affect, commitment manipulations, and/or incentives (e.g., increased value of achieving a goal in Forster et al., 2005). As an example of concept importance, in Hart and Albarracin (2009), participants who a priori indicated high (vs. low) chronic-achievement motivation were listed as having higher (vs. lower) value for an achievement goal. As an example of affect, value was coded as higher when positive affect was coactivated with a positive concept or goal (e.g., socializing; Aarts et al., 2007) and its non-opposite control. As an example of value associated with actual incentives, Marien et al. (2012, Study 2) manipulated the higher or lower monetary value of a gift voucher to be received on the basis of task performance. As an example of a commitment manipulation, Maltarich’s (2009) participants responded to statements encouraging (vs. discouraging) commitment to the goal, which increased (decreased) commitment.

Subjective coding was also used to measure value by rating outcome relevance and value importance through subjective ratings of the extent to which completing the task would (or would not) fulfill the primed concept or goal and was relevant (or irrelevant) to participants’ values (e.g., extrinsic motivation and an intrinsic motivation task; Levesque, 1999). Specifically, we coded conditions as low when measures concerned behaviors that were not stated as being part of the study (e.g., touching one’s face, walking down a hallway, consuming candy unknowingly while watching something; see Boland et al., 2013; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Spears et al., 2004; Wryobeck & Chen, 2003) or outcomes that were deemed unmotivating to a group of participants (e.g., individuals with low achievement motivation receiving an achievement task, low commitment towards obtaining an outcome; see Hart & Albarracin, 2009;
Maltarich, 2009). We also recorded low value when behaviors were the stated focus of the study but were not associated with either important outcomes or important values from the point of view of the participants (e.g., anagrams, creative uses tasks; see Bargh et al., 2001; Stajkovic et al., 2006). In contrast, we recorded high value when they involved potential monetary rewards or future acquisition beyond the lab (e.g., winning a product, making money; see Chartrand et al., 2008; Hassin et al., 2009), actual academic outcomes (e.g., Lowery et al., 2007) or altruistic behaviors (e.g., Macrae & Johnston, 1998), or high value-relevant motivation (e.g., expressing held attitudes; see Albarracin & Handley, 2011). This value was coded by one author then confirmed by independent coding with 87% agreement (κ = .56; kappa between .41-.60 is moderate agreement, and between .61 and .80 is substantial agreement; Landis & Koch, 1977).

The objective and subjective codes for value were ultimately used to create an overall index of value. Specifically, we standardized manipulated value and coded value, then averaged the two indexes (indexes correlated r = .20). Behaviors with high value should be particularly likely to follow goal-driven principles, whereas direct perception-behavior effects may be present with greater independence of value.

**Expectancy.** As with value, we coded if a study distinguished high and low expectancy conditions using a manipulation or separating conditions based on a subject variable (i.e., higher, lower, or neither manipulated nor preselected; e.g., increased value of achieving a goal in Forster et al., 2005). Expectancy was coded as lower if the requirements of the task were difficult (e.g., the difficult benchmark to generate many creative uses for an object from Stajkovic et al., 2006) and as lower if the requirements of the task were easy (e.g., the lower benchmark from Stajkovic et al. 2006 to generate a few creative uses for an object).
Filler tasks and satisfaction opportunity. To address persistence/strengthening vs. decay of the priming effect, we recorded whether there were filler tasks between the priming task and the focal dependent measure in terms of (a) length of the filler task (in minutes), (b) identity of the task (e.g., crossing out specific letters in a body of text in Albarracin & Hart, 2011), and (c) filler task relevance (low or high) to the goal. The presence and length of the filler task should increase the effect size according to the temporal escalation criterion (goal activation increases over time; Birch et al., 1975; Chartrand et al., 2008; Forster et al., 2005, 2007) depending on filler task relevance. Relevance was coded based on whether there was a filler task, and if so, whether it could be construed as fulfilling the activated goal. Relevant filler tasks that provide satiation opportunities for the goal may prematurely fulfill the goal and lead to decay effects (Forster et al., 2005, 2007); irrelevant filler tasks (no satiation opportunity) should lead to escalation effects (e.g., Chartrand et al., 2008). For example, in Chartrand et al. (2008) the filler task (e.g., making a real decision between a thrift and prestige option before another subsequent choice) was highly relevant as it could fulfill the activated goal (thrift or prestige). In contrast, the filler task from Chartrand and Bargh (1996), in which participants listed street names after an impression-formation prime, was judged to have low relevance to the goal. We planned to examine whether this filler task code interacted with our value index to gauge whether decay and escalation principles are more prevalent in the more goal-inducing or motivating high-value behaviors (Forster et al., 2007; Higgins et al., 1985).

Exploratory Moderators

We recorded a number of characteristics of the studies, participants and procedures that were used in exploratory moderator analyses and controlled for in the main theory-based analyses when necessary.
**Descriptives.** To describe the source and participants of the studies, we coded general information about the studies including (a) year of publication, (b) laboratory (e.g., ACME, Goallab, MaSC), (c), percentage of female participants, (d) publication type (journal article, dissertation, unpublished data, replication), and (e) country of sample.

**Methodological characteristics.** We also coded studies according to other methodological characteristics of (a) the priming task, (b) the goal primed, (c) tasks prior to priming, (d) the behavioral outcome measure, (e) the debriefing procedure, and (f) other descriptive task characteristics.

We coded the **priming task** on several dimensions including (a) whether the task was supraliminal (e.g., Scrambled-Sentence Task in Chartrand et al., 2008) or subliminal (e.g., parafoveal priming in Chartrand & Bargh, 1996), (b) the method of goal priming, including scrambled sentence tasks (Chartrand et al., 2008), parafoveal priming (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996), lexical decision tasks (e.g., Shah & Kruglanski, 2003), finding words in a word search (e.g., Bargh et al., 2001), crossword puzzles (e.g., Marquardt, 2010), word completion tasks (e.g., Albarracin & Hart, 2011), and parafoveal and foveal priming (e.g., Aarts et al., 2007). We also recorded (c) the numbers of priming trials and total number of trials, (d) the inter-stimulus interval and mask length, (e) whether multiple goals were primed, and (f) the nature of the control condition, such as a non-opposite control goal (e.g., memory goals as the non-opposite control for impression-formation goals in Chartrand & Bargh, 1996), no task (e.g., Keatley, Clarke, Ferguson, & Hagger, 2014), neutral words (e.g., Bargh et al., 2001), or nonsense words (e.g., Jia, 2012).

With respect to the **primed goal**, we coded the nature or content of the primed goal(s) (e.g., achievement, socializing, health, etc.).
As for the dependent measure, we coded the (a) identity of the outcome task (i.e., anagrams, reaction time, time spent on task, consumption choice, helping rate, distance seated from another, number of spacebar presses or thoughts listed, selective exposure bias, amount of face touching, speed, whether task was continued, memory performance, number of creative uses generated, volunteering for future studies, feedback provided, classification of items, cleanliness behavior, monetary donation or spending, and choice of tasks). We also coded (b) task flexibility based on how many means could be used to solve the task and whether the task allowed for multiple answers. For example, many reaction-time-based tasks, product selection (Sela & Shiv, 2009), and simple motor behaviors like walking down the hallway (Wryobeck & Chen, 2003) were judged to be inflexible, whereas anagram tasks and creative-uses tasks (Shah & Kruglanski, 2003; Stajkovic et al., 2006) were deemed flexible. The last coded dimension with respect to the dependent measure was (c) social desirability based on whether the behavior in question was likely to be the target of impression management, and either desirable or undesirable, or was likely unrelated to social desirability. For example, the task in Macrae and Johnston (1998) in which the participant can help the experimenter was judged to be socially desirable, whereas most motor (e.g., Ginsberg et al., 2012) or achievement (e.g., Bargh et al., 2001) behaviors were judged unrelated to social desirability.

Finally, we recorded whether the study had any explicit funneled debriefing or explicit awareness check questions.

Results

Description of Conditions and Studies

Overall, we obtained 352 total effect sizes ($e$) from 133 different studies. These 133 studies produced 283 contrasts units ($k$) prior to unpacking into multiple effect sizes between a
primed concept and a non-opposite control. A description of the distribution of methods, primes, and study composition for the 133 studies (K) and 283 contrast units (k) can be found in Table 1.

As shown in Table 1, of the 133 studies (K), a majority (80%) were from published sources, were published during the median year of 2009, and were conducted in the US (58%) as well as other countries (42%). Additionally, about 9% (7%) of units (k) involved increasing (decreasing) goal value manipulations, whereas 23% (77%) of units had high (low) value codings. Only 20% of units had filler tasks. A majority of the studies (72%) used supraliminal priming methods (e.g., scrambled sentence tasks) over subliminal priming methods, and 90% of studies used a control consisting of neutral words as opposed to nonword strings (e.g., Bargh et al., 2001). On average, a little over three-fourths (M = .76, SD = .23) of the words or trials of the priming task were primes as opposed to filler words. Our sample of studies generally included inflexible (66%) rather than flexible tasks as dependent measures, and a majority of studies (76%) implemented an explicit awareness check of some form (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 2000).

Average Effect Size

We first examined the weighted mean effect size from the 352 effect sizes (e) modeled at the level of 133 studies (K). This yielded a weighted-average fixed effect \( d = 0.332 \) (95% CI [0.276, 0.388]; \( t(132) = 11.78, p < .001 \)), and a weighted-average random effect \( d = 0.352 \) (95% CI [0.292, 0.411]; \( t(132) = 11.89, p < .001 \)). For both of these models Cochran’s \( Q(351) = 934.77, p < .001 \) rejected the null hypothesis of homogeneity, and \( I^2 \) indicated considerable nonrandom variability (Higgins & Thompson, 2002; Huedo-Medina et al., 2006) of 62.45% (95% CI [59.67, 64.95]). Specifically, an \( I^2 \) of 62.45% implies moderate to large nonrandom heterogeneity (Borenstein et al., 2009; Higgins & Thompson, 2002; Huedo-Medina et al., 2006),
justifying moderator analyses. The distribution of these effect sizes can be found in the histogram in Figure 1.

**Publication Bias**

In terms of publication bias, both Rosenthal’s (1979) and Rosenberg’s (2005) methods suggested that the number of mean-weighted filedrawer studies necessary to bring nonsignificance exceeds a reasonable (i.e., 5e+10) threshold. Specifically, we examined this average effect size via our aforementioned plan to examine publication bias, inclusive of checking the Failsafe number (Rosenberg, 2005; Rosenthal, 1979; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008). Considering only the independent effect sizes, findings suggested the need of 57,426 (36,440) nonsignificant mean-weighted studies to reduce the overall effect to nonsignificance via the Rosenthal (Rosenberg) method. These numbers far exceed the 1,770 (5*352 + 10 = 1770) study threshold previously set regarding at what point filedrawer studies become a concern (Rosenthal, 1991; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008).

A trim-and-fill analysis and Egger OLS regression confirmed potential concerns about publication bias, but revealed a confidence interval containing the true effect size that does not include zero (Duval & Tweedie, 2000a, 2000b; Egger et al., 1997; Stanley, 2005). A trim-and-fill analysis of the independently-modeled effect sizes via the $R^2_0$ estimator added nine studies that yielded a new, estimated fixed-effects $d_f = 0.295$ (95% CI [0.264, 0.325]; $z = 19.08, p < .001$) and random-effects $d_r = 0.312$ (95% CI [0.257, 0.366], $z = 11.15, p < .001$), suggesting a significant effect after accounting for publication bias. Similarly, an Egger OLS modeled at the study level indicated a small study effect (fixed effects: $t(218) = 4.25, p < .001$; random effects: $t(218) = 5.19, p < .001$). We additionally used these analyses to identify outliers to be removed from further analyses, which led to removing nine effect sizes from eight studies in subsequent
analyses (Jefferis & Fazio, 2008, Study 1; Keatley et al., 2014, Study 1; Legal et al., 2007, Study 1; Levesque, 1999, Study 2; Macrae & Johnston, 1998, Study 2; Oettingen et al., 2006, Study 4; Roehrich, 1992, Study 1; Sela & Shiv, 2009, Study 3). The funnel plot of the RE analyses appears in Figure 2 (Light & Pillemar, 1984).

We also addressed a common concern within meta-analytic work about whether trim-and-fill estimates are biased in the presence of heterogeneity among studies (Johnson & Eagly, 2014; Terrin et al. 2003). According to this concern, the requirement for trim-and-fill effect sizes to be from one population deems the method inaccurate when there is high effect-size heterogeneity (Johnson & Eagly, 2014). Recognizing this criticism, we conducted separate trim-and-fill analyses for separate levels of moderators. We did not find any immediate indication that heterogeneity related to coded moderators skewed our trim-and-fill analyses (see Table 2).

After removing effect sizes from the trim-and-fill analysis and modeling the studies at the study level, we obtained an average effect size of $d_\text{a} = 0.315$ (95% CI [0.262, 0.369]; $t(132) = 11.75, p < .001$) from fixed-effects models and $d_\text{r} = 0.323$ (95% CI [0.269, 0.377]; $t(132) = 11.95, p < .001$) from random-effects models. Both of these analyses again rejected the null homogeneity hypothesis ($Q(342) = 806.43, p < .001$) and had a similar $I^2$ value of 57.59% (95% CI [54.08, 60.72]), again demonstrating between moderate and large heterogeneity. This new effect size has a Rosenthal (Rosenberg) failsafe number of 46,930 (31,623), which again exceeds the $5k+10$ threshold and suggests that publication bias is unlikely to fully explain our findings (Rosenthal, 1991; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008).

We also ruled out that the effect sizes emerge from two different distributions using a normal-quantile plot (Figure 3) of the 343 individual effect sizes, which also checks for non-normality of the data (Wang & Bushman, 1998, 1999). The normal-quantile plot examines
potential publication bias by reviewing whether the shape of the curve has any discontinuities around 0 (indicative of publication bias) or has an S-shaped structure that may signal two underlying populations (Wang & Bushman, 1998). A Shapiro-Wilk normality test on the 343 data points yielded a marginally significant p-value ($W = 0.992, p = .073$), suggesting non-normality of the data that might indicate publication bias, which we characterized as insufficient to explain our effect. The shape of the distribution did not immediately suggest that the studies come from two populations (curve not S-shaped; Wang & Bushman, 1998).

Finally, $p$-curve analyses suggested that selective reporting could not explain the results of the set of studies from which we drew our effect sizes (Simonsohn et al., 2014). We present two sets of $p$-curve analyses (based on continuous tests) of the studies in this meta-analysis: (a) a $p$-curve on all studies conducted using $p$-values based on the researchers’ focal hypotheses (Simonsohn et al., 2014), and (b) $p$-curves based on studies with the largest error degrees of freedom. The former curve can be found in Figure 4 and concerns results based on the focal hypotheses of authors (often including interaction effects rather than mere differences between prime and control conditions). When we included all studies (published or unpublished) with clear hypotheses for behavioral measures (as outlined in our $p$-curve disclosure table), we found no evidence of $p$-hacking (no left-skew), but dual evidence of a right-skew and flatter than 33% power. The $p$-curve being flatter than 33% indicated that on average the studies considered in this meta-analysis are greatly underpowered to discover the effect of interest in the study, though selective reporting alone cannot explain the entirety of the evidence. We again found this pattern when we restricted the $p$-curve to studies in the top half of error degrees of freedom (see Figure 5). However, when we restricted the $p$-curve to studies in the top third (see Figure 6) or top quartile (see Figure 7) of degrees of freedom, we found a clear right skew, which also indicated
that selective reporting alone cannot explain the study results. Disclosure tables for these $p$-curves can be found in the supplementary materials.

**Moderator Analyses**

Tables 3 and 4 present the results from the moderator analyses. These analyses predicted $d$ in a particular case as a function of the level of a moderator/s, using both simple and multiple regressions. In the simple regressions, each moderator in the tables was introduced alone; in the multiple regressions, all moderators in table 4 were added to the regression as covariates. $QB$ comprises the Sums of Squares Regression or Sums of Squares Between in an ANOVA context. This statistic is distributed as a chi-square and indicates if the effect of a moderator or an interaction is statistically significant. Both fixed- and random-effects models are reported in the tables.

**Theoretical Moderators.** Fixed effects and random effects analyses corresponding to our theoretical predictions appear in Table 3 and include analyses of value, expectancy, delay/satisfaction opportunity, and predicted interactions between value and expectancy and between value and delay/satisfaction opportunity. Both simple and multiple regressions were conducted and yielded similar results and exhibited no collinearity problems.

**Value.** The first three rows in Table 3 present the effects of value, for which we used the coded and overall value indexes. Consistent with prior literature suggesting that increases in value should yield larger goal mediated effects, we found a significant association between the overall value index and the behavioral priming effect for high ($d_{FE} = 0.450$; $d_{RE} = 0.443$) and low ($d_{FE} = 0.195$; $d_{RE} = 0.210$; see A.3 in Table 3) value (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Forster et al., 2005, 2007).
Expectancy. Contrary to theorizing from both Forster et al. (2007) and Locke and Latham (1990), there were no differences in the strength of priming across high- \(d_{FE} = 0.252; d_{RE} = 0.232\) and low-expectancy \(d_{FE} = 0.164; d_{RE} = 0.166\) levels (see B in Table 3).

Delay with satisfaction opportunities. Responses to delay and satisfaction opportunities are useful to diagnose if perception-behavior, goal mediation, or both mechanisms underlie the obtained priming effect. For example, uniform decay across conditions would point to perception-behavior as the sole mechanism explaining our effects. Likewise, uniform persistence or escalation would point to goal mediation as the primary process implicated in our average priming effect. If high-value concepts are more likely to involve motivational principles, then the interaction between value and delay/satisfaction should enable us to test the plausibility of the proposed effect of delay for goals in the literature. An interaction between value and delay/satisfaction opportunity, however, would likely reveal that both mechanisms occur in different conditions.

There was little evidence suggesting that only perception-behavior or only goal mediation explains behavior priming effects. First, as shown in D in Table 3, we see little decay between those effect sizes that have no delay between priming \(d_{FE} = 0.321; d_{RE} = 0.329\) and the outcome measure and those with a delay without satisfaction \(d_{FE} = 0.332; d_{RE} = 0.342; FE QB_2 = 0.02, ns; RE QB_2 = 0.03, ns\), which is consistent with maintenance of goal activation. Second, the analysis (E) in Table 3 revealed a significant interaction between value and the three-level variable indicating no delay, delay without satisfaction opportunity, or delay with satisfaction opportunity. The decomposition of this interaction provided important information. Comparing across higher- and lower-value situations suggested that goal activation occurred over and above direct perception-behavior effects and thus strengthened the priming effect. Specifically, in the
absence of a delay, higher-value (see E.1) conditions showed stronger priming than the corresponding lower-value (see E.2) conditions ($FE\,QB_2 = 30.01, p < .001; RE\,QB_2 = 23.91, p < .001$). Furthermore, higher-value conditions with a delay without satisfaction opportunities showed stronger priming than the corresponding lower-value conditions ($FE\,QB_2 = 30.23, p < .001; RE\,QB_2 = 23.45, p < .001$). These results support the notion that goal activation contributes over and above perception-behavior in explaining priming effects.

**Descriptive and Methodological Moderators**

We also conducted exploratory analyses of descriptive study characteristics (year, publication type, and country) and methodological factors (goal type, liminality, proportion of primes, etc.) using simple and multiple meta-regressions. These analyses were carried out for fixed-effects and random-effects models, and are reported in Table 4. Variance inflation factors for the multiple regression analyses were under 10, suggesting no immediate collinearity problems (Cohen et al., 2003).

For our descriptive moderators, although we observed no decline effect as a function of study year (Schooler, 2011), we found that published studies yielded larger priming effects than unpublished studies. We also observed larger effect sizes for non-US studies but this moderation did not hold in the multiple regression models. Furthermore, our methodological moderators did not yield significant differences in either single or multiple regressions.

**General Discussion**

Since the early look at whether primes could guide behavior, a burgeoning literature has searched for the theoretical explanations and boundaries of the behavioral effects of priming. The initial findings gave credence to the perception-behavior model, one in which passive perception of an internalized behavior concept influences behavior (Bargh et al., 1996; Bargh & Morsella,
Researchers simultaneously broadened the theoretical horizon to encompass the key motivational concepts of goals, value, expectancy, and potential for goal satiation (Atkinson, 1974; Bargh et al., 2001; Chartrand et al., 2008; Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Forster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007).

Beyond initial demonstrations, the behavior priming literature expanded the scope of priming to such diverse applications as health behaviors (Wryobeck & Chen, 2003), social mimicry (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003), and consumer choice (Chartrand et al., 2008; Sela & Shiv, 2009), suggesting that the effect is widely relevant. Yet, the study of priming has received immense censure due to several high-profile replication failures (Doyen et al., 2012; Harris, Coburn, Rohrer, & Pashler, 2013; Klein et al. 2014; Pashler, Harris, & Coburn, 2008; Shanks et al., 2013). In this context, we sought to synthesize past research on this effect in a precise way that might help to find answers to the controversy. We excluded studies without a non-opposite comparison (e.g., achievement versus neutral, or impression-formation versus memory, but not action versus inaction) to verify that the effect of the prime is directionally-consistent with predictions tested in a conservative fashion. We aggregated published and unpublished reports of the behavioral effects of priming and estimated publication bias with various contemporary techniques (Duval & Tweedie, 2000a, 2000b; Rosenberg, 2005; Rosenthal, 1979). We aimed to establish the magnitude and robustness of these effects, and test the theory-relevant moderators of value, expectancy, and goal satiation opportunities (e.g., by fulfilling the goal; Chartrand et al., 2008), while controlling for methodological differences (liminality, priming task, or use of funneled debriefing awareness checks) in the synthesized effects.

**Findings and Importance of this Meta-Analysis**
This meta-analysis integrated several hundred effect sizes concerning behavioral priming contemporaneously with clamor over the replicability of effects within priming (e.g., Klein et al., 2014). Whereas other work has concentrated on individual studies (e.g., Doyen et al., 2012; Harris et al., 2013), and other meta-analyses concerning priming have only concentrated on non-behavioral or intention-based measures, we incorporated a variety of priming methods, primes, and outcome measures, offering a broader perspective on effect size variability. By observing multiple studies, we are able to circumvent the meaning of one or two individual failures to replicate in favor of observing the population of studies, so we could overcome the limitations of selective narrative reports either supporting or attacking the literature (Borenstein et al., 2009; Cooper & Hedges, 2009a, 2009b).

Further, this meta-analysis allowed us to shift the discussion of priming effects from individual failures or successes to the theoretical principles explaining behavior priming (i.e., Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Bargh et al., 2010; Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Forster et al., 2007). We found support for two important tenets of how goals are conceptualized. First, as predicted, the effects of priming were stronger when participants valued the outcome of the measured behavior, either because value was manipulated to be high, such as in the use of incentives in exchange for accurate responses, or because the participants inherently valued the outcome (e.g., students attempting a graded intelligence test). These findings indicate that our results are more than just concept priming because these effects depend on valuation (less for low value, stronger effects for high value; Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Forster et al., 2007).

Contrary to both accounts of the effect of outcome expectancy on the strength of behavioral priming effects (Forster et al., 2007; Locke & Latham, 1990), we failed to observe significant moderating effects of expectancy manipulations. Our research synthesis showed no
evidence that increasing expectancy boosts priming effects through increased motivation (Forster et al., 2005) or that individuals worked harder to achieve the more difficult goals (Locke & Latham, 1990). Of the two accounts, however, research in other domains indicates that lower-expectancy goals result in greater effort than higher-expectancy ones (Budden, 2007; Locke & Latham, 1990; Heath et al., 1999; Maltarich, 2009; Stajkovic et al., 2006).

Further, we found some support for goal tenets based on the impact of satiation opportunities provided by tasks introduced between priming and behavior measurement (Chartrand et al., 2008; DeCoster & Claypool, 2004; Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Forster et al., 2005, 2007; Higgins et al., 1985). Highly-valued behaviors or states were directionally associated with more decay when there were satisfaction opportunities, as compared to when there were not. When behaviors or states were not valued, however, the delays were directionally associated with decay, suggesting that the smaller effect of priming was due to direct behavior activation. This effect is important and was not obtained in a prior meta-analysis of evaluative priming effects (DeCoster & Claypool, 2004).

In addition, our meta-analysis addresses whether behavioral priming effects and goal-mediation coexist or operate in a mutually exclusive way. As we observed significant priming effects in conditions not conducive to goal activation (e.g., lower value; Forster et al., 2007), perception-behavior seems to take place in a relatively default way although this effect is small. Behavioral priming effects can stem from mere concept accessibility similar to previously established effects in the area of interpretation of information (see Higgins et al., 1977). Correspondingly, we found stronger priming effects under conditions that are conducive to goal activation (e.g., higher value) and meaningful interaction between value and delay/satiation. The interaction in particular signaled that both perception-behavior and goal mediation can contribute
to behavioral priming effects. When value is higher, there is a reduction of priming when the delay offers satiation opportunities relative to when it does not. When value is lower, there is a reduction of priming between an immediate follow up (no delay) and a delayed follow up without satisfaction opportunities. Therefore, our meta-analysis is compatible with the conclusion that both processes can contribute to behavioral priming effects (Bargh, 1994).

**Methodological Recommendations for Future Behavior Priming Studies**

Investigators must make a daunting number of methodological decisions when conducting a priming study such as the number of prime trials to use, the proportion of primes to control words, and the liminal threshold of the primes. To help with these decisions, many knowledgeable researchers have made recommendations about priming study parameters based on their own perceived successes and failures (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). In contrast to prior recommendations based on anecdote or small empirical samples, we were able to quantitatively establish moderating effects of methodological procedures using the largest known sample to date ($e = 352$). Despite the large sample and thus relatively high statistical power, we found no effect of any methodological variable investigated, including whether the prime was supraliminal or subliminal, the proportion of priming task trials was higher or lower, the use of neutral primes or other control conditions, the selected type of dependent measure (performance, social, consumption, and other), or the flexibility of the chosen dependent measure. This large amount of evidence converges in the important conclusion that researchers have a high degree of flexibility when selecting priming study parameters without expecting major differences in effectiveness of the prime and strength of the effect.

Even though characteristics of the priming method or the dependent measure make little difference, our findings point to the importance of ensuring high value for the primed behavior or
goal in a particular study, either because of introduced incentives or personal values. One potential concern for studies attempting to replicate the effects of achievement or social priming is that the participants of the replication sample may not value the primed goals in the same way as the original sample. This possibility is consistent with speculation that replicators may be stepping on a moderator that derails any priming effects (Cesario, 2014).

Despite this overall conclusion about methodological variability, three considerations are worth noting. First, the present results are necessarily bound by the range of values observed in the meta-analysis. For example, although the proportion of prime trials does not appear to influence effect size within the observed range of [0.25, 1], values outside this range may lead to differences in effectiveness. Second, these parameters did not moderate the results when collapsing across other parameters, but the various parameters may influence behavior priming in interaction with features of the task or sample. Third, moderation of effect size is not the only concern researchers have when creating studies, and researchers may thus still have valid reasons for making certain parameter choices. For instance, even though the proportion of priming to neutral trials did not moderate our effect sizes in our analyses, it may influence the likelihood that participants spontaneously identify the researchers’ hypotheses. Therefore, the lack of moderation found in our synthesis does not imply that these parameters are unimportant and should be ignored or chosen carelessly. Rather, the lack of moderation simply indicates that there is no evidence that researchers should prefer one level of these parameters to the other when considering effect size.

Finally, we encourage all researchers that argue that they are studying goal effects to include more tests of the temporal escalation and satiation. In our dataset, less than a third of the effect sizes tested introduced a delay between the priming and the dependent measure (e.g.,
Chartrand & Bargh, 1996). We urge more researchers to test (and journal editors to require tests of) these goal criteria to better categorize the phenomenon so that future work may gain a better consensus over the underlying mechanisms of behavior priming.

**Sample Sizes and a Potential Resolution to the Replicability Crisis within Priming**

In our meta-analysis, the majority of the effect sizes were calculated for between-subjects comparisons between priming and control conditions based on an average cell size $n = 24.29$ ($SD = 10.84$). Given that the fixed-effects average effect size with outliers was $d = 0.332$, an $n$ of that the typical behavior priming study was severely underpowered to detect effects. Specifically, as shown in Table 5, with $d = 0.332$, $n = 24.29$, and $\alpha = .05$, a two-sample $t$-test has a power of merely .20 to detect a significant effect if it exists. In contrast, obtaining a power of .80 requires a minimum sample size of $n = 143$ participants per condition, or $n = 159$ after excluding the nine outliers from our sensitivity analyses. Even if researchers of these effects had expected larger-than-average effects, the current average sample size of $n < 25$ per condition is inadequate and only appropriate for the unlikely effect size of $d \geq 0.81$.

Our estimates and considerations depicted in Table 5 have major implications for the current replicability crisis in the behavior priming arena. With the estimated average power of .20 obtained from our synthesized literature, replication attempts should produce non-significant results at a rate of 4:1, making a large number of failed replications uninformative about the existence of behavior priming effects. For example, Doyen et al. (2012) presented two failures (one nonsignificant reversal and one almost-null effect) to replicate Bargh et al.’s (1996) Experiment 2a. However, Doyen et al.’s sample sizes of 120 (Study 1) and 50 (Study 2) had power of .44 and .21, respectively. Thus, both of these replication attempts had a higher
probability of failure than success, and the failures are not indicative of an earlier Type I error. The current replicability crisis may obey widespread misinterpretations of null results from low powered studies rather than appropriate acceptance of the null hypothesis in high powered studies. In this context, our meta-analysis synthesized effect size estimates from a very large number of studies to produce a high-power estimate of behavior priming effects, leading to the most credible assessment up to this point.

Our sample size recommendations of \( n = 143 \) (or \( n = 159 \)) per condition are in line with current recommendations that sample sizes for two-group studies should use about \( n = 100 \) per condition (e.g., Fraley & Vazire, 2014). By using larger samples, researchers will increase the probability of detecting true effects, replicating previously identified effects, and improving the credibility of our scientific findings (Button et al., 2013; Ioannidis, 2005; Prinz et al., 2011; Sullivan, 2007). Overall though, we hope that our approach to addressing replicability within behavioral priming research can serve as a model for other areas of science that are also experiencing drops in confidence (Button et al., 2013; Sullivan, 2007).

**Future Directions**

Despite the strengths of the current meta-analysis, there are limitations that remain to be addressed in future research. First, the current study only examined word primes that were directly related to the behavioral outcome assessed in the study. This decision may limit the generalizability of our results because other types of primes (e.g., pictures, physical body poses) and primes that have a less clear relation with the dependent measure may produce different effects. For example, stimuli such as stereotypes (e.g., elderly; e.g., Bargh et al., 1996, studies 2a and 2b) and money (e.g., Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006), which have received attention in some replication attempts (e.g., Doyen et al., 2012; Klein et al., 2014; Pashler et al., 2008; Tate, 2009),
may yield weaker effects because their relation to behavior is more nuanced. Even more recently, the literature has focused on non-word primes (e.g., faces; e.g., Hill & Durante, 2011) that may be intentionally introduced in the field (e.g., a picture of a woman winning a race; e.g., Shantz & Latham, 2009) or occur naturally (e.g., litter; e.g., Keizer, Lindenberg, & Steg, 2008). Future research should address these questions by examining whether prime type and prime specificity moderate behavioral priming effects in a potentially broader meta-analysis. Similarly, our results specifically addressed behavioral effects of primes, and the presence (or lack) of moderation by various parameters should not be expected to generalize to other outcomes, such as cognitive or affective dependent measures. The field of priming is sufficiently rich to allow for broad integration and understanding of these different findings.

Several other considerations deserve discussion. First, meta-analysis is a correlational research method. Before strong causal inferences are made concerning the relations we have identified, these claims must be experimentally addressed by manipulating goal value or whatever moderator researchers seek to understand. Another criticism may be that our meta-analysis does not account for priming effects with opposite stimuli (e.g., action versus inaction, thrift versus prestige, competition versus collaboration). Priming opposites is clearly ambiguous for determining which prime has an effect, or whether both primes differ from a baseline in an unexpected way. For example, fast and slow primes may lead to the finding that fast primes lead to faster completion times than slow primes. However, the absence of a control prevents ascertaining whether the fast primes are expediting performance or slow primes are halting performance, or both. Of course, estimated effects may be much larger when comparing opposites but we chose to be conservative and precise.
Readers may also wonder whether our meta-analysis might have had an adequate number of unpublished experiments. Trying to sample unpublished effect sizes, we requested such data from hundreds of authors and obtained a substantial number of unpublished observations (over 20%), comparable to that in van den Bussche et al. (2009) and higher than that in DeCoster and Claypool (2004). Furthermore, we used multiple meta-analytic methods to address concerns about publication bias (e.g., Duval & Tweedie, 2000; Rosenthal, 1979; Simonsohn et al., 2014; Wang & Bushman, 1998, 1999), thus moving our understanding of the phenomenon in an important way.

**Ethical Considerations of Priming**

A small but robust behavioral priming effect suggests potential real world implications of priming in such diverse areas as student motivation (e.g., Bargh et al., 2001), health behavior (e.g., Connell & Mayor, 2013; Wryobeck & Chen, 2003), and altruism (e.g., Macrae & Johnston, 1998). Priming could have the potential to accompany recent decision making findings on defaults and nudges that improve economic and social outcomes such as savings and organ donation (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; Thaler & Benartzi, 2004). Although the effect size of behavioral priming from this meta-analysis may appear small, its effect on the scale of thousands or hundreds of thousands of individuals could yield a sizable difference (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). For example, according to our meta-analysis, the odds that people primed with eating will eat can be readily ascertained by transforming our average $d_e$ (from fixed effects analyses when excluding outliers) into an odds and yield $1.78$. An odds = 1.77 implies a 77% increase in the behavior as a consequence of the prime. Moreover, for high-value scenarios (one standard deviation above on the goal index, $d_e = 0.450$), the fixed effects $d_e$ would yield an odds of 2.26,
which would suggest a 126% boost in the effects of priming for scenarios in which individuals who valued a goal are primed.

Yet, despite the potent benefits from priming, there may be both backlash from individuals if they recognize they are being influenced (Brehm, 1966; Clee & Wicklund, 1980; Friestad & Wright, 1994) and concern over recipients’ consent. Individuals who become cognizant of subtle attempts to shift their behavior may react in ways opposite of what the priming intended, thus severely undermining the positive influence of priming (Clee & Wicklund, 1980). Further, in contrast to the imperative of informed consent to health and psychological treatment, the priming in this literature occurs without explicit awareness of the prime’s presence or its effect. How to obtain consent without eliminating efficacy remains to be resolved before priming can be used with clinical objectives.

A potentially controversial side of priming is also well known if used in consumer advertising or political propaganda. The fable of James Vicary’s success at increasing sales in movie theatres is always a reminder of the unethical implications of priming (Strahan et al., 2002). Although Vicary’s claim and the mere existence of any of the research he reported is now known to be false, any effect of priming brings similar questions (Gibson & Zielaskowski, 2013; Strahan et al., 2002). Even though priming may be implemented with good intentions, there are also scenarios in which priming may become or be perceived to be coercion. However, it is important to note that priming cannot instill and trigger goals people do not possess (Bargh et al., 2010) and individuals may even react against goals they devalue (e.g., Hart & Albarracin, 2009).

**Conclusion**
The debate over whether incidentally-presented stimuli can affect behavior has intensified in recent years after an explosive growth in research and several open science initiatives (Cesario, 2014; Dijksterhuis, 2014; Harris et al., 2013; Shanks et al., 2013).

The results of this meta-analysis showed small but robust significant effects of word primes on behavior and indicated that these effects obey the principles of value and goal satiation. Future work should continue to unify the theory and boundary conditions of behavioral priming effects as part of research attention to replicability. We hope that our meta-analysis will contribute to advance this mission.
Table 1. Study Description (K = 133 studies and k = 283 units)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Type of statistic</th>
<th>Study (K) Summary</th>
<th>Unit (k) Summary</th>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td><strong>Md</strong></td>
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<td>2007.71 (4.65)</td>
</tr>
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<td>212 (75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unpublished Count (%)</td>
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<td>71 (25)</td>
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<td>177 (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-US Count (%)</td>
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<td>106 (37)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Non-manipulated Count (%)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Decreased Count (%)</td>
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<td>21 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Value Coding</strong></td>
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<td>66 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Count (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>217 (77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal Expectancy Manipulated</strong></td>
<td>Increased Count (%)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-manipulated Count (%)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Decreased Count (%)</td>
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<td><strong>Filler Task</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Absent Count (%)</td>
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<td><strong>Methodological features</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liminality</strong></td>
<td>Supraliminal Count (%)</td>
<td>96 (72)</td>
<td>211 (75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subliminal Count (%)</td>
<td>37 (28)</td>
<td>72 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of Primes</strong></td>
<td>M (SD)</td>
<td>.76 (.23)</td>
<td>.74 (.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Md</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.67</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Control</strong></td>
<td>Neutral Count (%)</td>
<td>120 (90)</td>
<td>248 (88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Count (%)</td>
<td>13 (10)</td>
<td>35 (12)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Flexibility</strong></td>
<td>Inflexible Count (%)</td>
<td>88 (66)</td>
<td>183 (65)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Flexible Count (%)</td>
<td>45 (34)</td>
<td>100 (35)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Debriefing</strong></td>
<td>Yes Count (%)</td>
<td>101 (76)</td>
<td>218 (77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Count (%)</td>
<td>32 (24)</td>
<td>65 (23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Theoretical features specified at contrast unit (k) level only due to variation within on those factors potentially being manipulated within study.
### Table 2. Heterogeneity analysis for trim-and-fill analyses

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Studies Added</th>
<th>Effect Size Calculation</th>
<th>R0 Estimator</th>
<th>L0 Estimator</th>
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<td>Fixed Effects</td>
<td>Random Effects</td>
<td>Fixed Effects</td>
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<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.295 [0.264, 0.325]</td>
<td>0.312 [0.257, 0.366]</td>
<td>0.212 [0.183, 0.241]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subliminal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.359 [0.299, 0.418]</td>
<td>0.371 [0.272, 0.470]</td>
<td>0.289 [0.231, 0.346]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supraliminal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.275 [0.240, 0.310]</td>
<td>0.295 [0.230, 0.359]</td>
<td>0.191 [0.158, 0.225]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Published</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.375 [0.340, 0.411]</td>
<td>0.395 [0.331, 0.458]</td>
<td>0.284 [0.250, 0.317]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpublished</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.103 [0.044, 0.161]</td>
<td>0.116 [0.035, 0.197]</td>
<td>-0.008 [-0.062, 0.047]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Coded Value</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.268 [0.234, 0.301]</td>
<td>0.288 [0.226, 0.349]</td>
<td>0.177 [0.145, 0.209]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Coded Value</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.418 [0.349, 0.487]</td>
<td>0.416 [0.306, 0.526]</td>
<td>0.396 [0.328, 0.464]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderator</td>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Fixed-effects models</td>
<td>Random-effects models</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Simple (QB)</td>
<td>Multiple (QB') (d.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Value</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Value manipulation</td>
<td>Higher (+1)</td>
<td>32.57***</td>
<td>35.73***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neither selected nor manipulated for level (0)</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>0.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low (-1)</td>
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<td>0.637</td>
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<td>2. Coded value</td>
<td>Higher (+1)</td>
<td>4.65*</td>
<td>2.31</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.427</td>
</tr>
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<td>3. Overall value index</td>
<td>Higher (+1)</td>
<td>25.86***</td>
<td>25.12***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower (-1)</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>[0.377, 0.522]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Expectancy</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Higher (+1)</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neither selected nor manipulated for level (0)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower (-1)</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>0.325</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.164</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moderator, Level</td>
<td>Fixed-effects models</td>
<td>Random-effects models</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>k</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>FE</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Value Index x Expectancy</td>
<td>Higher expectancy</td>
<td>0.460</td>
<td>[0.350, 0.571]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower expectancy</td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>[0.330, 0.546]</td>
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<td>D. Delay/Satisfaction Opportunity</td>
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<td>266</td>
<td>0.321</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delay without Satisfaction</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0.332</td>
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<td>Delay with Satisfaction</td>
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<td>0.068</td>
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<td>E. Overall Value Index x Delay/Satisfaction opportunity</td>
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<td>[0.343, 0.511]</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Delay without Satisfaction</td>
<td>0.541</td>
<td>[0.387, 0.695]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delay with Satisfaction</td>
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<td>[-0.130, 0.562]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>No Delay</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>[0.154, 0.313]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delay without Satisfaction</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>[-0.032, 0.285]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delay with Satisfaction</td>
<td>-0.910 [−1.820, 0.000]</td>
<td>-0.915 [−1.743, −0.087]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes.* ¹Multiple regression analyses were done by adding all moderators from Table 4 as covariates into the regression.
² *F*-ratio for omnibus effect

^p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; k = number of effect sizes; d = Hedges’ d, QB = index of effect size homogeneity such that when it is significant, reject null hypothesis of homogeneity
Table 4. Descriptive, Methodological, and Exploratory Moderator Analyses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moderator</th>
<th>Fixed-effects models</th>
<th>Random-effects models</th>
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<td>Unpublished</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0.095</td>
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<td>United States</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>0.260</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-US</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>0.399</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liminality</td>
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<td>Supraliminal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subliminal</td>
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<td>0.408</td>
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<td>Proportion of Primes (Dosage)</td>
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<td>0.345</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
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<td>0.280</td>
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<td>Neutral Control</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>0.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.402</td>
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<tr>
<td>Type of prime</td>
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<tr>
<td>Achievement-oriented prime</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>0.262</td>
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<td>0.360</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social prime</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.415</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>0.304</td>
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<td>Consumption or health prime</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>0.412</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>0.312</td>
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<tr>
<td>Type of dependent measure</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Performance measure</strong></td>
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<td>Non-Performance</td>
<td>63</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Consumption measure</strong></td>
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<td>Consumption</td>
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<td>0.331</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Consumption</td>
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<td>0.313</td>
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<td><strong>Flexibility</strong></td>
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<td>Inflexible</td>
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<td><strong>Social Desirability</strong></td>
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<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>0.320</td>
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<td><strong>Debriefing</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>0.321</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>0.298</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1Multiple regression analyses were done by adding all moderators from Table 4 as covariates into the regression. 
^ p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; k = number of effect sizes; d = Hedges’ d, QB = index of effect size homogeneity such that when it is significant, reject null hypothesis of homogeneity.
Table 5. Analysis of Statistical Power for Replication Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect Size Calculation</th>
<th>FE Effect Size ($d$)</th>
<th>Average $N$</th>
<th>Power of Average Study from our Meta-Analysis</th>
<th>Cell Size for Power = .80</th>
<th>Doyen et al., Study 1 ($N = 120$)</th>
<th>Harris et al. (2013), Study 1 ($N = 106$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Including Outliers</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>48.57 (n = 24.29)</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e = 352)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluding Outliers</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>49.17 (n = 24.59)</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e = 343)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: $e$ is number of effect sizes, $N$ is number of participants, $n$ is number of participants per cell.
Figure 1. Histogram of effect sizes from the meta-analysis.
Figure 2. A Funnel Plot of the (random-effects weighted) effect sizes in the meta-analysis, with effect sizes on the X-axis and Standard Error (precision) on the Y-Axis.
Figure 3. Normal-quantile plot of the effect sizes, excluding nine outliers, in the meta-analysis.
Figure 4: p-curve on dataset of authors’ predictions (interactions and main effects).
Figure 5. p-curve on the studies with the top half of error degrees of freedom.
Figure 6. *p*-curve on the studies with the top third of error degrees of freedom.
Figure 7. *p*-curve on the studies with the top quartile of error degrees of freedom.
References

References marked with an asterisk indicate studies included in the meta-analysis.


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http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0015329


Footnotes

1 A minority of the studies that argue goal mediation directly test the motivational properties of their effects. Accruing over studies, however, allows meta-analysis to provide these tests.

2 We chose the R0 estimator per recommendation from Duval and Tweedie (2000b) to use the L0 estimator if the number of missing studies estimated exceeds 25% of the total studies. Because that was not the case, we opted to use the R0 estimator, but we include the L0 estimates in Table 2. These estimates again confirm that adjusting for publication bias cannot bring the effect to nonsignificance.

3 We recognize that running studies with such large sample sizes can potentially be prohibitively expensive or a suboptimal allocation of resources. Requiring having almost 300 subjects to run a two-cell design may be difficult without relying entirely on Amazon Mechanical Turk (Goodman et al., 2013). An alternative is for behavioral priming to pioneer stronger within-subject designs that can enable more observations from fewer subjects (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008). Indeed, some other researchers are starting to explore these designs with fruitful results (Payne, Brown-Iannuzzi, & Loersch, in prep).